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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether there were any legal issues or genuine issues 
of material fact that should have prevented the district court 
from granting defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
2. Whether the district court properly denied a motion 
for leave to amend brought after the court had ruled on the 
cross-motions for summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff and appellant Rose Mitchell's ("Mitchell") 
statement of the facts in her opening brief is generally accurate 
as far as it goes but is incomplete in critical respects. 
Mitchell's most serious omission is her failure to explain the 
procedural history of the case, which defendant and respondent 
Hillhaven Corporation Voluntary Participant Benefit Trust 
("Hillhaven") believes is dispositive and renders irrelevant the 
arguments contained in Mitchell's brief. 
The case involves a dispute about whether Mitchell is 
obliged to return approximately $3,300 in medical benefits paid by 
Hillhaven to Mitchell on the condition that it be repaid in the 
event Mitchell received a settlement or obtained a judgment 
compensating her for injuries caused by a third party. 
1. Procedural History 
The facts, outlined below, are straightforward and are 
not in dispute. The procedural posture of the case is less clear, 
thanks to Mitchell's inappropriate tactics and failure to adhere 
to the requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Mitchell's complaint asks for an interpretation of the 
language of a medical plan that Mitchell contends relieves her of 
the burden of reimbursing Hillhaven (R at 2-4), while Hillhaven1s 
counterclaim asks for judgment based on an assignment executed by 
Mitchell and signed by Mr. DeBry, her attorney (R at 10-13). 
No answer to the counterclaim was filed and no 
affirmative defenses were raised. Instead, the parties agreed to 
and did file cross-motions for summary judgment, each on the 
parties1 respective theories of the case. Hillhaven submitted an 
affidavit as well, authenticating the assignment upon which its 
counterclaim rested (R at 53-60). For eight months the memoranda 
stayed on file before the motions were called up for hearing. 
Mitchell did not respond to Hillhaven1s motion and did not file 
any affidavits in support of her motion or in opposition to 
Hillhaven1s. No defenses to the assignment were ever raised. 
There were no allegations of fraud, coercion or mistake — the 
usual defenses in avoidance of a written document — in the 
complaint or her written memorandum. 
It was only after Hillhaven1s counsel pointed out in oral 
argument on the cross-motions for summary judgment that no 
allegations legally sufficient to defeat the assignment had ever 
been made that Mitchell's counsel orally offered the suggestion 
that there might be fraud or coercion. 
After the court ruled, granting Hillhaven1s motion for 
summary judgment and denying Mitchell's motion, Hillhaven's 
counsel prepared an order and judgment. As required by the 
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Supplementary Rules of Practice for the Third Judicial District, 
Rule 4(b),i/ a copy was submitted to Mitchell's counsel 
before filing (R at 80). Before the judgment was signed, 
Mitchell's counsel prepared a motion to amend the complaint and to 
withhold entry of judgment (R at 73-75). In the proposed amended 
complaint, Mitchell sought to raise allegations of fraud that 
might raise sufficient factual questions to defeat summary 
judgment (R at 65-71). 
After a hearing on March 1, 1985 the court denied 
Mitchell's motion for leave to amend the complaint (R at 77, 81). 
On March 19, 1985 the judgment was signed and entered (R at 
78-80), and the order denying Mitchell's motion to amend her 
complaint was signed on April 8, 1985 (R at 81-82). On April 19, 
1985, after hearing Mitchell's objections to the order denying the 
motion to amend, the court modified the order to read that the 
motion to amend was denied because no triable issue of fact had 
been raised (R at 82). 
2. Factual Background 
Hillhaven Corporation employees, such as Mitchell, 
receive as part of their employee benefits the right to 
hJ The rule provides as follows: 
Copies of the proposed order, judgment or decree in civil and 
domestic cases shall be served on opposing counsel before 
being presented to the court for signature unless approved as 
to form by opposing counsel, or the court otherwise orders. 
Notice of objections thereto shall be filed with the court and 
served on opposing counsel no later than five (5) days after 
service of said proposed order, judgment or decree. 
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participate in the Hillhaven Corporation Voluntary Participant 
Benefit Trust, which provides reimbursement for medical and 
hospital expenses. The medical benefits are provided pursuant to 
the Trust Major Medical Plan ("Plan"). The Plan is administered 
by Northwestern National Life Insurance Company, but Hillhaven 
itself is not an insurance company (R at 29-30). 
In the Plan booklet, the section entitled "Coordination 
of Benefits" contains a subsection entitled "Third Party 
Liability," the intent of which is to avoid the payment of 
duplicate benefits to any Plan participant.!' While 
Hillhaven will pay if there is no other recovery in the case of 
illness or accidental injury "caused by an act or an omission to 
act by another person. . . ," there are two conditions precedent 
to the Plan's paying otherwise eligible expenses. These 
conditions precedent are (1) the submission of the expenses to any 
other insurance or health plan that has incurred "third party 
liability" to the Plan member and (2) execution of a written 
agreement to reimburse the Plan if damages are collected. When 
the medical expenses paid by the Plan are subsequently also paid 
by a third party, the Plan seeks reimbursement of the portion it 
paid on the basis of the assignment it required to be executed. 
In summary, then, those Plan participants who are 
injured or become ill and are not otherwise compensated are paid 
—' A copy of the relevant plan provision is 
attached to the brief as Appendix A. 
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by the Plan, Those who have received compensation once, however, 
are not allowed to receive double compensation for the same injury. 
In the case at bar, Mitchell was in the process of trying 
to collect compensation for her medical expenses and injury when 
she sought payment for hospital and doctor bills from the Plan. 
As a condition of her receiving benefits, Hillhaven required her 
to execute an assignment to Hillhaven of "any monies recovered by 
court judgement, insurance settlement, or otherwise, on account 
of, or in connection with" the injuries she received from the fall 
in the home of Mr. and Mrs. Wilson (R at 30-31). The assignment 
was for no more than amounts paid by the Plan on account of the 
injuries sustained in the fall.2' 
The assignment, signed by both Mitchell and her attorney, 
Robert DeBry, also contained an acknowledgment that the assignment 
was required by the Plan as a condition precedent to payment of 
benefits. 
After receiving payment from the Plan, Mitchell claimed 
she should not have been required to sign the assignment. She did 
not, however, object at the time, refuse to sign the assignment 
and bring suit to force the Plan to make the payment she now 
claims she was entitled to. Instead, Mitchell got her Plan 
r/ A copy of the assignment executed by Mitchell 
is attached to the brief as Appendix B. As Mitchell correctly 
points out, when she requested the assistance of the Plan in 
paying her hospital and medical expenses, she was sent a copy of 
the Plan provision that Hillhaven contends covers her case and an 
assignment form. 
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benefits, got her settlement and then refused to reimburse the 
Plan, as she had agreed.i/ 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Because Mitchell did not respond to Hillhaven's 
motion for summary judgment and, in particular, because she did 
not file opposing affidavits, no factual issues were raised to 
support any defenses to the assignment of benefits executed by 
Mitchell and signed by her attorney. 
2. The undisputed facts are legally insufficient to 
defeat the assignment, since no claims for fraud, failure of 
consideration, duress or bad faith are stated by or can be 
inferred from the facts that are in the record. 
ARGUMENT 
There are before the Court only two questions on appeal, 
namely (1) whether there were factual issues or incorrect legal 
rulings that should have precluded summary judgment and (2) 
whether Mitchell's motion to amend was properly denied. No other 
issues were raised in or implicated by the proceedings below. 
_' Correspondence attached to the affidavit of 
Dan Holets shows Mitchell's inquiry about whether the Plan would 
waive its claims under the assignment so she could accept a 
settlement offer of $12,500. (R at 56-57) Ultimately she 
negotiated a settlement for and received $16,000 (R at 31), an 
increase of $3,500 or approximately the amount of the double 
recovery that Mitchell has refused to repay to Hillhaven. 
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I. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS REQUIRED TO FIND THERE WERE NO FACTUAL 
ISSUES BECAUSE OF MITCHELL'S FAILURE TO FILE OPPOSING 
AFFIDAVITS. 
In the district court Hillhaven based its motion for 
summary judgment on the assignment and Mitchell based her motion 
on a claim that the assignment was not required by the Plan. 
Mitchell failed to respond to Hillhaven1s motion for summary 
judgment and failed to file any opposing affidavits, although she 
was on notice, and' had been for months, that Hillhaven rested its 
claims on the assignment she executed. She thus failed in her own 
motion and in her response to raise any factual issues that could 
preclude summary judgment. Accordingly, at the time the court 
heard and ruled on the cross-motions for summary judgment, it had 
before it no defenses to the assignment itself. It was only in 
the proposed amended complaint that allegtions of fraud, bad faith 
and failure of consideration appeared (R at 65-70). 
Moreover, even if the court had permitted Mitchell to 
amend the complaint, so that she had raised additional issues in a 
pleading, this would not be sufficient to raise a dispute about 
the material facts.2' Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, addresses this possibility: 
5/ There is an additional objection to 
Mitchell's efforts to raise factual issues after the court's oral 
ruling. The local rules of the Third District Court require 
counsel to serve proposed orders for which they cannot obtain 
opposing counsel's consent five days before they can be signed by 
the court. Accordingly, if issues not properly raised in 
connection with summary judgment motions can simply be introduced 
(Footnote continued on next page) 
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When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this Rulef an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, 
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
This Court has strictly interpreted the language of the rule and 
held that the opponent of a motion for summary judgment must file 
affidavits raising factual issues "or risk the trial court's 
conclusion that there are no factual issues." Franklin 
Financial v. New Empire Development Corp., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 
(Utah 1983); Cowen & Co. v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 
109 (Utah 1984); Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982); 
Lockhart Co. v. Anderson, 646 P.2d 678 (Utah 1978). 
Based on Rule 56 and the cases interpreting it, the 
attempt to amend the complaint was legally insufficient to raise 
any factual issues, since pleadings are not a substitute for sworn 
affidavits. Hence, the district court's denial of the motion for 
leave to amend was not only perfectly proper but the court could 
not have done otherwise. Having ruled on the matters before it by 
way of summary judgment and there being nothing further in the 
record that could raise a factual dispute, the district court had 
(Footnote continued from previous page) 
by way of a motion to amend after the court has ruled and counsel 
discovers the judge's thinking, then the utility of such motions 
will be greatly diminished, since counsel for the losing party is 
assured of at least five days within which to prepare a motion to 
amend. 
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before it no basis for reopening a matter that had already been 
decided. 
For the same reasons, Mitchell is not entitled to raise 
these same issues on appeal to this Court. 
For a question to be considered on appeal, the record must 
clearly show that it was timely presented to the trial court 
in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon; . . . 
Franklin Financial, 659 P.2d at 1045. Mitchell failed to 
adhere to this requirement by offering affidavits in the district 
court proceedings and should not now be permitted to avoid the 
consequences of that failure by arguing- the issues of fraud, 
consideration and coercion as though they are now properly at 
issue in this appeal. 
II. MITCHELL'S DEFENSES TO THE ASSIGNMENT ARE LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT 
TO DEFEAT IT. 
Mitchell has gone well beyond the record to create the 
illusion of unfairness on the part of Hillhaven. Had she followed 
the procedures set out in Rule 56, of course, then Hillhaven would 
have had an opportunity to respond in the district court. Even 
without the benefit of facts Hillhaven could have introduced 
below, however, it is apparent that none of Mitchell's claims 
warrants serious consideration. 
A. Claims for Fraud Will Not Stand When There Is No 
Misrepresentation. 
Mitchell complains that she was fraudulently induced to 
execute the assignment because Hillhaven misrepresented that the 
assignment was required under the Plan provisions. Since Mitchell 
concedes that she received a copy of the pertinent portions of the 
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Plan, however, there is no basis for her claim that she was misled 
as to its requirements. 
In Utah, in order to establish a claim of fraud, the 
plaintiff must show: 
(1) [tlhat a representation was made; (2) concerning 
a presently existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) 
which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made 
recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon 
which to base such representation; (5) for the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other 
party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) 
did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; 
(9) to his injury and damage. 
Pace v, Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273, 274-75 (1952). 
Since Mitchell has the burden of showing each of these nine 
elements and since she cannot, as a matter of law, establish 
elements (2) or (6), her claim is unsustainable-. 
1. Hillhayen's Position was Fully Disclosed Before 
Mitchell Executed the Assignment. 
As to element (6), that Mitchell acted in ignorance of 
the supposed misrepresentation's falsity, her own admission that 
she received the Plan provision relied on by Hillhaven in 
requiring the execution of the assignment shows she knew or should 
have known of the thing of which she complains. Mikkelson v. 
Quail Valley Realty, 641 P.2d 124, 126 (Utah 1982) (plaintiff 
not entitled to complain about square footage of house when corrct 
figure was disclosed in appraisal report); Cheever v. Schramm, 
577 P.2d 951, 954 (Utah 1978) (plaintiffs did not reasonably rely 
on representations as to income of company when they had 
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opportunities to inspect and did inspect business records, which 
showed actual expenses of company). 
2. Representations About the Legal Effects of 
Documents are Not Actionable, 
Furthermore, Mitchell cannot establish a second necessary 
element of fraud, namely that there was a misrepresentation of a 
presently existing material fact. The only claimed 
misrepresentation was that the Plan required the execution of the 
assignment, yet this is a statement as to the legal effect of a 
document and hence is not actionable. Berkeley Bank for 
Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 805 (Utah 1980); 
Ackerman v. Bramwell Investment Co., 80 Utah 52, 12 P.2d 623 
(1932). 
In short, Mitchell and her attorney had access to the 
document upon which Hillhaven based the assignment and could have 
determined for themselves then what they now claim, after Mitchell 
received double compensation for her injuries. Her claim to have 
been deceived by what was fully disclosed simply does not 
withstand scrutiny and can only be construed as an attempt to 
divert attention from Mitchell's refusal to keep her agreement 
with Hillhaven. 
B. There is No Failure or Lack of Consideration. 
1. The Assignment was Permitted Under Plan 
Provisions 
In order to make a claim for lack of consideration 
Mitchell conveniently proposes to read out of existence 
substantial portions of the relevant Plan provisions upon which 
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Hillhaven relied in requiring Mitchell to execute the assignment. 
As a general policy, Hillhaven attempts to control costs for 
medical care for beneficiaries of the Plan by, inter alia, 
reimbursing members for medical expenses only after all other 
possible sources of payments are exhausted.zf To 
implement this general policy beneficiaries are required to agree 
to reimburse Hillhaven in the event of a recovery to the extent of 
the benefits provided (R at 45). 
The applicable Plan provision thus requires a participant 
injured by another to submit eligible expenses "to any other 
insurance plan or health plan" which has incurred liability, and 
specifically includes as an example no fault insurance plans. 
Mitchell imagines that Hillhaven must have meant by this language 
other first-party insurance carried by the Plan participant, 
because no fault insurance can be first-party insurance and 
because of Plan language referring to written denials and the 
appeal of such denials. (App. Br. at 7) 
Mitchell's argument is thus roughly as follows: the Plan 
means something other than what it says; on my interpretation, the 
-
7
 The preface of the Plan booklet from which 
Mitchell quotes also states: 
By coodinating benefits with other group plans, we want you to 
secure the maximum reimbursement for eligible expenses from 
your combined coverages. We feel sure that you do not wish to 
receive more than 100% reimbursement when any additional 
payments would come from the Trust Fund deposits of your 
fellow employees and the corporation. 
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Plan was not entitled to require the assignment; therefore the 
assignment was invalid. 
In fact, contrary to Mitchell's assertions, the language 
of the Plan is consistent with the Court's understanding of the 
term "third-party" insurance in Beck v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 978 n.2 (Utah 1985):Z/ 
We use the term "first-party" to refer to an insurance 
agreement where the insurer agrees to pay claims submitted to 
it by the insured for losses suffered by the insured, . . . In 
contrast, a "third-party" situation is one where the insurer 
contracts to defend the insured against claims made by third 
parties against the insured and to pay any resulting 
liability, up to the specified dollar limit. 
In the Beck case, the plaintiff was injured in a hit 
and run accident in a stolen car. He submitted a claim to the car 
owner's insurance company but liability was denied. Presumably, 
had the process been available, Beck could have "appealed" within 
the company or, had the case appeared meritorious, he could have 
sued the insurer.
 :[d. at 796. Having received no 
compensation from the third-party insurer, however, Beck turned to 
his own first party insurance company to make his claim. In other 
words, in the Beck case the procedure envisaged by the 
Hillhaven Plan provision was followed, at least in part, when a 
claim was initially submitted to a third-party insurer. 
In the case at bar, the homeowner who bore some 
responsibility for Mitchell's fall had third-party insurance, as 
U This case on appeal was also handled by 
Robert J. DeBry, representing the plaintiff. 
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defined by Beck, and a claim was submitted by Mitchell's 
attorney. Unlike Beck, Mitchell negotiated and ultimately 
received a settlement from the third-party insurer, a settlement 
that took account of and included the amount that Mitchell knew 
she would have to repay the Plan, The first-party insurer, 
Hillhaven, was thus relieved of any obligation to pay as well 
under the terms of Mitchell's contract.—' 
2. There was Separate Consideration for the 
Assignment 
Mitchell claims there was no consideration for the 
assignment, viewed as an independent basis for her obligation to 
Hillhaven.2' Even if the Court accepts Mitchell's theory 
of the case to the extent of holding that Hillhaven was not 
entitled to require the assignment under the Plan language, the 
undisputed facts are that Mitchell executed the assignment and 
received the payment she sought. 
Thus, the case can be conceptually analyzed as involving 
a separate agreement. In exchange for Hillhaven1s agreement to 
pay immediately a claim it believed it could have waited to pay 
2/ If Mitchell had submitted a claim to State 
Farm Insurance Co., the company carrying the homeowners policy 
which ultimately paid for Mitchell's injuries, and if the claim 
had been denied and the denial had been appealed under the express 
terms of the provision the Plan would have paid. None of this 
happened, however, since State Farm paid Mitchell. 
zJ If there were no dispute or if the Court 
finds that the assignment was properly required pursuant to the 
Plan, of course, consideration would not be an issue at all. It 
becomes an issue only because the district court based its ruling 
on the assignment alone. 
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and possibly never paid, Mitchell executed an assignment to repay 
Hillhaven in the event she obtained compensation. There is 
sufficient consideration under the circumstances. See, 
e.g. , Thayer v. Brady, 28 Wash.2d 767, 184 P.2d 50 
(1947). 
As an alternative basis for decision, the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel also applies. Mitchell promised, by executing 
the assignment, to return any overpayment of her medical expenses 
to Hillhaven, and on the strength of that assignment Hillhaven 
gave Mitchell, in effect, an interest-free loan to pay her medical 
expenses until the issue of her settlement was resolved. In 
addition, Hillhaven, by helping Mitchell with immediate medical 
expenses, took the risk that Mitchell could not or would not 
reimburse the plan, as she promised, thereby suffering a 
detriment. Mitchell knew, of course, that it was only by 
executing the assignment that she could induce the action she 
sought. Accordingly, she should now be estopped from repudiating 
her agreement. See, e.g., Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. 
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1980). 
C. Mitchell's Apparent Attempt to Plead Duress or Bad 
Faith Cannot be Sustained. 
Mitchell's hyperbolic effort to analogize her situation 
to an injured person releasing a right to sue should not be 
confused with a legally recognized defense to the assignment she 
executed. Hillhaven has been unable to determine, given the 
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complete lack of citation to authority, exactly what point 
Mitchell is attempting to make in her brief. 
1. There was No Duress or Coercion 
It is possible that Mitchell is attempting to argue 
duress or coercion, one of the classic defenses to a contractual 
obligation, but there is simply no attempt to set out the elements 
of such a defense. See, e.g., Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 
619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980) (to defeat a contract on basis of 
duress a party must show that the other party committed a wrongful 
act which put other party in fear so as to compel him to act 
against his will). Furthermore, the Court has previously 
recognized that being in difficult circumstances, such as needing 
to pay doctor bills, is not legally sufficient to constitute 
duress. Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751 (Utah 
1982) (emotional distress and need for money to pay for surgery 
for handicapped son not sufficient to show coercion and invalidate 
a release). 
Although conceivably a person in a "half lit hospital 
room" (Appellant's Brief at 10) might be subject to overreaching, 
Mitchell was not such a person and her attempts to evoke the 
Court's sympathy by speculaton as to her financial need go far 
beyond the record. Moreover, Mitchell was at all times assisted 
by counsel, who handled both her claim against the homeowners and 
her request for assistance from Hillhaven and who presumably 
advised her as to her legal rights and obligations when she 
executed the assignment that also bears his signature. 
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2. Mitchell Fails to State a Claim for Bad Faith 
Alternatively, Mitchell may believe a mere assertion of 
bad faith, however groundless, may somehow state a claim. In 
light of the Court's ruling in Beck v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), however, such a belief is 
unjustified. In Beck, the Court confined claims of bad faith 
in the settlement of insurance claims to actions based on breach 
of contract rather than in tort, and in particular to breaches of 
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
There is not any evidence in this case that Hillhaven 
breached such an implied covenant. As outlined in Beck, the 
duties of a first-party insurer are these: 
[W]e conclude . . . that the insurer will diligently 
investigate the facts to enable it to determine whether a 
claim is valid, will fairly evaluate the claim, and will 
thereafter act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or 
settling the claim. 
Id. at 801. Since Hillhaven fully disclosed its position to 
Mitchell and quickly responded to her request by paying her 
medical bills, there is nothing Mitchell can point to that would 
constitute a breach of any obligation under the contract. 
Contrary to Mitchell's insinuations, the assignment was clearly 
limited to any amounts received by Mitchell on account of the 
injuries caused by her fall up to but not in excess of any payment 
by the Plan. See Appellant's Brief at 9, where the quotation 
omits the limiting language of the assignment. 
If there has been bad faith at all, it can only be 
inferred from Mitchell's promise to repay the Plan, immediately 
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followed by her adamant refusal to do so. Short of Hillhaven's 
giving up a bona fide claim sustained by the district court, it is 
difficult to imagine how Hillhaven's actions could have been more 
circumspect. 
In short, even if the Court were to rule that Mitchell 
had preserved her complaints, an examination of her claims lays 
bare their lack of substance. Even on Mitchell's fanciful view of 
the facts that goes well beyond the record, there is simply no 
basis for defeating the assignment of benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the district court's ruling 
granting Hlllhavenfs motion for summary judgment should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this /s f day of November, 1985. 
John H. Pierce 
FOSTER, PEPPER & RIVIERA 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
TeJrrie T. Mcintosh 
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true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to: 
Robert J, DeBry 
H. Brian Davis 
Robert J. DeBry & Associates 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
965 East 4800 South 
Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
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Pre-Existing Conditions Limitation 
You and/or your covered dependents wi l l not be eligible for any benefits for 
eligible expenses relating to a Pre-Existing Condition A Pre-Existing Condi-
tion means either 
A Pre-Existing Condition means either 
• Conditions or symptoms which existed within one (1) year prior to the 
effective date of your coverage and for which a prudent person would 
ordinarily seek treatment or 
• any conditions or symptoms for which medical advice, care, or treatment 
was recommended or received within one (1) year prior to the effective 
date of your coverage 
However, following any of the periods described below, eligible medical 
expenses arising after the expiration of these periods wi l l be eligible for 
benefits payment according to the plan provisions 
• A period of six (6) consecutive months which ends any time after the 
effective date of the individual's coverage in which the covered person 
has not received any prescribed drugs or medicines, medical care, 
treatment, or advice of such illness or injury 
• You have been covered under this plan for twelve (12) consecutive 
months 
COORDINATION OF BENEFITS 
How do other group type plans affect benefits? 
The Plan wi l l coordinate benefits if you or your covered dependent are eligible 
to receive benefits or services for medical/dental care or treatment which are 
provided by 
• Any group, blanket, or franchise insurance plan or any other covering 
individual or members as a group 
• Any group hospital service prepayment plan, group medical service 
prepayment plan, group practice, or other prepayment coverage 
• Government plans, including Medicare as explained in the following 
section, or statute 
One plan is primary One plan is secondary The primary plan pays benefits in 
accordance with its terms The secondary plan pays a reduced amount which, 
when added to the benefits paid by the primary plan, equal 100% of eligible 
expenses 
Which plan is primary? 
A plan that does not coordinate with other plans is always the primary plan If 
both plans coordinate, the primary plan is determined in the following order 
1) The plan which covers you or your covered dependent as an employee, 
rather than as a dependent, is primary 
2) If a child is a covered dependent under both plans, 
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• the plan of the person who is financially responsible for a dependent 
is primary 
• when the parents are separated or divorced, the plan of the parent 
with custody is primary, 
• when the parents are divorced and the parent with custody of the 
chi Id has remarried, the plan of the parent with custody is primary and 
the plan of the stepparent is secondary 
• If neither 1 or 2 applies, the plan which has covered you or your 
covered dependent the longest is primary 
Norwithstanding any provision of the immediately preceding sentences to the 
contrary, payment of benefits by the plan, as a secondary plan wi l l be 
contingent upon submission ot written proof by you or your covered depen-
dent to the Insurance Department of payment or denial ot payment, including 
any denial alter appealing, by the primary plan of benefits for eligible ex-
penses incurred 
If you or your covered dependent are also eligible for Medicare, the Plan wi l l 
adjust benefits tor Medicare before co-ordinating benefits 
How does Medicare affect benefits? 
If you are an entitled individual, benefits payable under the Summary of 
Health and Life Benefits wi l l be reduced first, by the benefits payable by 
Medicare for the same eligible expenses and second, by benefits payable by 
the Other Plan, provided such Other Plan is designated a "primary" plan 
Third Party Liability 
In the event you or your dependent incur eligible expenses for treatment of 
Illness or Accidental Injury caused by an act or an omission to act by another 
person, your right and the right of your dependent to receive benefits in 
payment of such eligible expenses is contingent upon submission of the 
eligible expenses for payment to any other insurance plan or health plan, 
including any No-Fault Automobile Insurance, or Personal Injury Protection, 
which has incurred third party liability to you or your dependent as a result of 
such person's act or omission to act (the "Third Party Plan") To the extent the 
Third Party Plan denies payment of the eligible expenses in writing and states 
its reasons for such denial and you have appealed such denial in strict 
accordance with the terms of the Third Party Plan, the Plan shall pay benefits 
to you or your dependent for such eligible expenses as provided by the terms 
of the Plan 
In the event the Medical Plan provides benefits in accordance with the above 
paragraph, you or someone legally qualified and authorized to act on your 
behalf must agree in writing to 
Reimburse the Plan to the extent of benefits provided under this Plan 
whenever damages are collected by legal action, settlement, or otherwise 
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For valuable consideration, the undersigned hereby assign(s) to pay 
over to the Hillhaven Corporation Voluntary Participant Benefit Trust, 
1015 Center Street, Caller Service 2264, Tacoma, Wa 98401-2264, any 
monies recovered by court judgement, insurance settlement, or otherwise, 
on account of, or in connection with injuries sustained by Rose Maria 
Mitchell, 218 Edith Avenue, Apt. 2, Salt Lake City, Ut 84111f arising 
out of that certain injury on January 21, 1983, at 224 Pioneer Street, 
Midvale, Ut, up to an amount equal to, but not in excess of the payments 
made or to be made by said Plan on account of medical, hospital, surgical 
and other expenses in connection woth or prising out of said injuries. 
I expressly authorize and direct my attorney to make payments of such 
monies to the Hillhaven Corporation Voluntary Participant Benefit Trust 
upon receipt of advice from said Plan as to the amount of such expenses. 
It is expressly understood that the rules and regulations of The Hillhaven 
Corporation Voluntary Participant Benefit Trust require thae making and 
effectuation of the Assignment as a condition precedent to the payment 
of any benefits with respect to the injury above. 
Date: 
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ACCEPTED AND APPROVED 
Date: £ — Jl . "XL.. / H < 7 » ^ Y&ULcU 
Employee Signature 
Attorney fs Signat 
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